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Abstract 
[Excerpt] One of the long held performance objectives of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has 
been to reduce the time period between the filing of the petition and union certification elections. This 
year the NLRB's 2010 Performance Accountability Report claimed that 86.3 percent of all NLRB elections 
were held within 100 days of the petition being filed and 95.1 percent of all initial elections were held 
within 56 days of the petitions being filed. Our analysis of Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) data from 
1999-2009 found that in the last two years there has been a slight increase in the number of 
representation elections being held between 21-30 days after the petition. But throughout the decade 
there have been virtually no election dates in the first 20 days after the petition is filed (see Figure 1). 
Thus, while the NLRB has made some progress in meeting their performance objectives, as former NLRB 
General Counsel Fred Feinstein explains, "the problem has been that a party in any election case has the 
ability to undermine the expression of employee free choice by manipulating the Board procedures to 
create delay”. 
These data on the timing of petition and election dates matter because the number of days between the 
petition and the election may make a great deal of difference as to whether or not a group of workers get 
union representation or a first contract. The time between the petition and the election also may make a 
difference as to whether an individual worker gets fired or gets his or her wages or benefits cut in 
retaliation for union activity, or ends up leaving a job, with or without a settlement, because of the 
coercion, threats, and/or harassment suffered throughout the employer's campaign. Over the last three 
decades there has been a wealth of scholarly research that has documented the gauntlet of threats, fear, 
retaliation, misinformation, and harassment workers have to endure in order to exercise their right to 
union representation and collective bargaining. 
However, none of the recent NLRB certification election research has examined the relationship between 
employer opposition and the timing of the election. This is because for the few researchers who have 
done the hard work of connecting election to unfair labor practice (ULP) data, the only timing variable they 
had to use for employer behavior was the date ULPs were filed. But since ULP charges can be filed as 
much as six months after the allegation occurred, "date filed" grossly underestimates when employer 
opposition begins. It is for this reason we were asked to follow up on our 2009 study on employer 
opposition and the breakdown of the unfair labor practice process (see No Hold Barred: The 
Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing) to examine the relationship between the petition 
date, election date, and when the most serious employer opposition occurs during representation 
campaigns. Upon completion of this analysis we would be able to determine whether our data provide 
empirical support for significantly reducing the number of days between petition and election in NLRB 
certification elections. 
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By Dr. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Senior Lecturer, Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations and 
Dr. Dorian Warren, Assistant Professor, Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs, 
Columbia University1 
One of the long held performance objectives of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been to 
reduce the time period between the filing of the petition and union certification elections. This year the 
NLRB's 2010 Performance Accountability Report claimed that 86.3 percent of all NLRB elections were held 
within 100 days of the petition being filed and 95.1 percent of all initial elections were held within 56 days of 
the petitions being filed.2 Our analysis of Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) data from 1999-2009 found that in 
the last two years there has been a slight increase in the number of representation elections being held 
between 21-30 days after the petition. But throughout the decade there have been virtually no election dates 
in the first 20 days after the petition is filed (see Figure 1). Thus, while the NLRB has made some progress in 
meeting their performance objectives, as former NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein explains, "the problem 
has been that a party in any election case has the ability to undermine the expression of employee free 
choice by manipulating the Board procedures to create delay/ '3 
These data on the timing of petition and election dates matter because the number of days between the 
petition and the election may make a great deal of difference as to whether or not a group of workers get 
union representation or a first contract. The time between the petition and the election also may make a 
difference as to whether an individual worker gets fired or gets his or her wages or benefits cut in retaliation 
for union activity, or ends up leaving a job, with or without a settlement, because of the coercion, threats, 
and/or harassment suffered throughout the employer's campaign. Over the last three decades there has 
been a wealth of scholarly research that has documented the gauntlet of threats, fear, retaliation, 
misinformation, and harassment workers have to endure in order to exercise their right to union 
representation and collective bargaining.4 
However, none of the recent NLRB certification election research has examined the relationship between 
employer opposition and the timing of the election.5 This is because for the few researchers who have done 
the hard work of connecting election to unfair labor practice (ULP) data, the only timing variable they had to 
use for employer behavior was the date ULPs were filed. But since ULP charges can be filed as much as six 
months after the allegation occurred, "date filed" grossly underestimates when employer opposition begins. 
It is for this reason we were asked to follow up on our 2009 study on employer opposition and the 
breakdown of the unfair labor practice process (see No Hold Barred: The Intensification of Employer 
Opposition to Organizing)6 to examine the relationship between the petition date, election date, and when 
the most serious employer opposition occurs during representation campaigns. Upon completion of this 
analysis we would be able to determine whether our data provide empirical support for significantly reducing 
the number of days between petition and election in NLRB certification elections. 
! 
BNA Plus.com NLRB representation election data, 1999-2009 
! 
! 
! 
2 
! 
Our 2009 report resulted from a request in 2006 by the Senate and House Health, Education, Labor, & 
Pensions (HELP) committees to assess the effectiveness of current law and Board practice in protecting and 
enforcing workers' rights in the NLRB election process. The goal was to provide rigorous academic research to 
inform the debate on labor law reform. The data for both that original research and this more recent analysis 
originate from a thorough review of primary NLRB documents from a random sample of 1,000 NLRB 
certification elections that took place between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003, and from an in-
depth survey of 562 campaigns coming out of that same sample. Our first findings from this research were 
released in May 2009 and have become one of the primary data sources for government, media, academics, 
and labor on both employer opposition and current Board practice during NLRB elections. 
Our method of measurement for this study is the time between the date of occurrence of serious unfair labor 
practice allegations and the date the petition was filed and/or the date the election was filed. Because each 
unfair labor practice charge sheet can include from one to as many as thirty different allegations, each with a 
different date of occurrence, most of which are not specified on the charge sheet, this is much more time 
consuming data to collect. In some cases it required reading through entire ULP document files, including 
employer responses, settlement agreements, complaints, dismissals, withdrawals, testimony, affidavits, and 
Board and Court decisions until the specific date for each serious violation in the charge was found. For this 
reason we only used charges filed during the last year of our sample—2003.7 
Table 1: Range of Timing between Occurrence of Serious ULP Allegations and Filing of Petition, ULP Allegations from 2003 Elections 
! 
Assistance or domination 
Coercive statements, 
including threats 
Discharge for union 
activity 
Discipline for union 
activity 
Harassment 
Interrogation 
Layoff for union activity 
Promise of benefits 
Retaliation for Board 
participation 
Solicitation/ distribution 
rules 
Surveillance 
Wages, benefits, or 
conditions altered 
Total serious allegations 
Serious allegations won 
Total allegations 
Days before petition filed 
150 
plus 
0.0% 
10.8% 
10.9% 
6.1% 
13.3% 
25.0% 
16.7% 
12.5% 
14.3% 
25.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
11.0% 
10.7% 
12.0% 
149-75 
0.0% 
10.8% 
6.5% 
9.1% 
13.3% 
10.0% 
16.7% 
0.0% 
14.3% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
9.1% 
9.2% 
10.0% 
8.7% 
74-30 
25.0% 
5.4% 
6.5% 
9.1% 
13.3% 
10.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
13.6% 
8.7% 
10.7% 
9.1% 
29-10 
0.0% 
10.8% 
13.0% 
3.0% 
6.7% 
5.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
25.0% 
13.6% 
9.6% 
8.6% 
9.1% 
9-0 
0.0% 
16.2% 
2.2% 
3.0% 
13.3% 
10.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
25.0% 
0.0% 
4.5% 
7.3% 
7.1% 
8.3% 
Days after petition filed 
1-10 
0.0% 
10.8% 
0.0% 
3.0% 
0.0% 
15.0% 
0.0% 
25.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
18.8% 
18.2% 
8.3% 
9.3% 
8.7% 
11-20 
0.0% 
13.5% 
8.7% 
15.2% 
13.3% 
15.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
42.9% 
12.5% 
18.8% 
9.1% 
12.8% 
12.9% 
12.4 % 
31-50 
50.0% 
13.5% 
15.2% 
9.1% 
6.7% 
5.0% 
16.7% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
4.5% 
10.6% 
8.6% 
9.5% 
41-50 
0.0% 
2.7% 
23.9% 
9.1% 
6.7% 
5.0% 
16.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
9.1% 
8.3% 
6.4% 
8.7% 
51-75 
0.0% 
5.4% 
8.7% 
21.2% 
6.7% 
0.0% 
33.3% 
12.5% 
28.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
4.5% 
9.2% 
10.7% 
8.7% 
76 plus 
25.0% 
0.0% 
4.3% 
12.1% 
6.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
13.6% 
5.0% 
5.0% 
4.6% 
% 2003 
Sample 
1.7% 
15.4% 
19.5% 
13.7% 
6.2% 
8.3% 
2.5% 
3.3% 
2.9% 
3.3% 
6.6% 
9.1% 
90.5% 
25.7% 
100.0% 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Warren, NLRB Document Database of ULP documents from sample of 1000 certification elections from 1999-2003 
with a 99 percent FOIA response rate from the NLRB. 
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Table 1 presents serious unfair labor practice allegations from all the 2003 elections in our sample, broken 
down by the time between date of occurrence of serious allegations and the petition, while Table 2 breaks 
the data down by the time between date of serious allegations and the election. The most significant finding 
in our study can be found in the bottom rows of Table 1. Thirty-one percent of serious violations occurred 30 
days before the petition was filed and 47 percent of all serious allegations occurred before the petition was 
filed. Similarly 47 percent of all serious allegations won through Board or Court decisions or settlements 
occurred before the petition was filed. The serious allegations findings in both Tables 1 and 2 also reveal the 
pervasiveness, consistency, and intensity of employer opposition to workers exercising their rights to be 
represented by a union and to bargain collectively. This opposition starts long before the filing of the petition 
and continues on after the petition is filed while workers wait for the election, and persists still after the 
election. 
This mission is accomplished through multiple tactics at the employer's disposal. Tables 1 and 2 list the 
building blocks of employer campaigns.8 It is no accident that they are also all serious ULP violations, those 
most likely to gain a settlement favorable to the union, pre or post complaint or a Board or Court order win. 
These include threats, interrogation, surveillance, fear, coercion, violence, retaliation and harassment for 
union activity, promises and bribes, and election and union interferences. Employers penalize workers in 
many ways; by transferring them to more onerous work assignments, cutting wages or benefits, layoffs, 
contracting out, and, most egregiously, discharging workers or shutting down, contracting out, or outsourcing 
all or part of the facility. 
Table 2: Range of Timing between Occurrence of Serious ULP Allegations and the Election date (in number of days before 
election), ULP Allegations from 2003 Elections 
! 
Assistance or domination 
Coercive statements, 
including threats 
Discharge for union activity 
Discipline for union activity 
Harassment 
Interrogation 
Layoff for union activity 
Promise of benefits 
Retaliation for Board 
participation 
Solicitation/distribution rules 
Surveillance 
Wages, benefits, or conditions 
altered 
Total serious allegations 
Serious allegations won 
Total allegations 
150 
plus 
days 
50.0% 
16.2% 
17.4% 
12.1% 
20.0% 
40.0% 
33.3% 
25.0% 
14.3% 
25.0% 
12.5% 
4.5% 
18.3% 
17.1% 
18.7% 
149-75 
days 
0.0% 
21.6% 
10.9% 
18.2% 
26.7% 
25.0% 
16.7% 
25.0% 
14.3% 
0.0% 
25.0% 
27.3% 
19.3% 
20.7% 
19.1% 
74-60 
days 
50.0% 
8.1% 
10.9% 
15.2% 
6.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
14.3% 
12.5% 
25.0% 
13.6% 
11.5% 
10.0% 
11.6% 
59-50 
days 
0.0% 
8.1% 
13.0% 
9.1% 
13.3% 
5.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
14.3% 
25.0% 
0.0% 
9.1% 
8.7% 
11.4% 
7.9% 
49-40 
days 
0.0% 
8.1% 
4.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
6.3% 
9.1% 
4.6% 
4.3% 
4.6% 
39-30 
days 
0.0% 
13.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
13.3% 
15.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
14.3% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
9.1% 
6.9% 
10.0% 
7.5% 
29-20 
days 
0.0% 
8.1% 
2.2% 
6.1% 
6.7% 
10.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
14.3% 
0.0% 
31.3% 
4.5% 
7.3% 
5.0% 
7.9% 
19-10 
days 
0.0% 
8.1% 
13.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
5.0% 
16.7% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
5.5% 
6.4% 
5.0% 
9-0 
days 
0.0% 
8.1% 
4.3% 
6.1% 
6.7% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
0.0% 
4.5% 
4.1% 
4.3% 
5.0% 
After 
Election 
0.0% 
0.0% 
23.9% 
33.3% 
6.7% 
0.0% 
33.3% 
12.5% 
14.3% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
18.2% 
13.8% 
10.7% 
12.9% 
% 2003 
Sample 
1.7% 
15.4% 
19.5% 
13.7% 
6.2% 
8.3% 
2.5% 
3.3% 
2.9% 
3.3% 
6.6% 
9.1% 
90.5% 
25.7% 
100.0% 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Warren, NLRB Document Database of ULP documents from sample of 1000 certification elections from 1999-2003 
with a 99 percent FOIA response rate from the NLRB. 
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There are several distinct stages to a union organizing campaign that are important to understand in order to 
interpret the significance of the data presented above. First there is the initial period where the first contact 
is made between the workers and the union, leaders are identified and an organizing committee is 
established. The second phase is when the union, through the organizing committee, reaches out to the 
bargaining unit members and gradually builds up support until the workers are ready to petition for an 
election.9 The third phase is the period between the date the petition is filed and the election date. This is 
when both the union and employer campaigns are most out in the open, but as our data show this is not 
when the employer campaigns begin. Finally the fourth phase is the period between the date of election and 
the date of certification, which can include waiting for election objections, ULPs, and possible rerun elections 
to be resolved.10 
Our findings show that serious violations occurred across each of these time periods, from discharging, 
threatening, and harassing leaders in the earliest stages of building the organizing committee; to using 
surveillance, interrogation, and threats to try to dissuade workers from attending union meetings or speaking 
with organizing committee members prior to submitting the petition; all the way to retaliating against the 
most outspoken union activists at the very end of the election campaign. Finally on the day of the election 
and those immediately following we found many cases of employers targeting those who were election 
observers or witnesses in NLRB hearings. 
One representative example of employers' pattern of early, persistent, and unrelenting opposition that we 
recorded in our NLRB ULP Document Database comes from Hillside Acres in Willard, Ohio. The United Food 
and Commercial Workers (UFCW) launched an organizing campaign in late 2002. According to the 
Consolidated Complaint issued on December 6, 2002, 62 days before the petition was even filed, Hillside 
initiated its anti-union campaign by making an example of one of the union activists in the earliest phase of 
the campaign, starting with a written warning.11 Hillside disciplined that same employee again on December 
9, suspended her the next day, and fired her a week after that. The company also disparately enforced its 
solicitation policy. Throughout the next two weeks the employer campaign expanded to other employees and 
included violations such as interrogation, bribes, onerous assignments for union activity, and another 
discipline and discharge. This all was before the end of December, 41 days before the petition was filed. 
Starting mid-January, the company began surveillance and threatened workers with wage reductions and 
facility closure. 
The UFCW filed the petition for an election on February 6. According to the Complaint, on February 26, 
Hillside, discharged one employee and disciplined another in retaliation for their participation in NLRB 
proceedings. On the following day, now 21 days after the petition, the employer made more threats and 
promises and in the following two months prior to the election, disciplined and harassed three more 
employees who were then all fired after the election. The threats, interrogations, surveillance, and disparate 
enforcement of solicitation rules also continued in the days and weeks after the petition was filed. By the 
time of the election on April 21, 2003, it had been nearly five months since the first serious allegation on 
December 6, 2002. The charge sheets, complaint and settlements all tell a story that is repeated over and 
over in numerous other campaigns—the intensity and constancy of the employer campaign and the fact that 
it begins long before the petition is filed. 
This pattern of aggressive employer opposition is not isolated to units such as Hillside where the union ran a 
winning campaign. As in the Hillside case we found a consistent pattern of employer tactics being used 
repeatedly and in combination throughout our sample. This is where our survey data on employer tactics can 
be very instructive.12 Table 3 uses both our survey data on employer behavior for 2003 (summarized in the 
last column of Table 3) and number of days between the earliest serious allegation and the date of the 
election from our ULP sample for 2003. 
5 
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Table 3: Differences in employer opposition depending on number of days before the election that the earliest serious ULP 
allegation occurred. NLRB Survey Data, 2003 and NLRB Sample, 2003 
! 
Number of captive audience meetings 
Number of letters 
Number of leaflets 
Number discharged 
Number of workers laid off 
Number of aggressive employer tactics 
! 
More than 5 captive audience meetings 
More than 5 employer letters 
More than 5 employer leaflets 
! 
Supervisor held one-on-ones at least weekly 
Used supervisor one-on-ones to interrogate 
Used supervisor one-on-ones to threaten workers 
Threatened losses of wages and benefits 
Discharged workers for union activity 
Alteration of benefits or conditions 
Promises of improvements 
Unscheduled raises 
Threats of plant closing 
Bribes or special favors 
Surveillance 
Bringing in extra security and/or putting up 
fencing 
Threatened or harassed union activists 
Brought in police 
Assisted anti-union committee 
Ran media campaign 
10 or more employer tactics 
150 
plus 
days 
15.78 
6.86 
13.00 
1.40 
.00 
12.90 
! 
.67 
.57 
.86 
! 
.90 
.60 
.70 
.50 
.50 
.20 
.40 
.50 
.78 
.30 
.00 
.30 
.60 
.20 
.40 
.00 
.60 
149-75 
days 
3.60 
4.20 
1.00 
1.75 
.00 
14.40 
! 
.20 
.4.00 
.00 
! 
.60 
.80 
.80 
1.00 
.80 
.60 
.80 
.20 
.60 
.20 
.00 
.20 
.80 
.40 
.60 
.00 
.80 
74-40 
days 
13.33 
4.00 
8.50 
2.63 
.00 
13.90 
! 
.78 
.29 
.80 
! 
.70 
.70 
.70 
.60 
.80 
.20 
.60 
.20 
.70 
.40 
.30 
.10 
.40 
.20 
.30 
.10 
.70 
39-20 
days 
7.00 
32.67 
36.00 
1.00 
1.00 
10.25 
! 
.50 
.67 
.67 
! 
.75 
.75 
.50 
.50 
.25 
.25 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.25 
.50 
19-10 
days 
20.00 
6.00 
8.00 
1.33 
.00 
10.67 
! 
1.00 
1.00 
.50 
! 
1.00 
.33 
.67 
.33 
1.00 
.33 
.33 
.33 
.00 
.00 
.67 
.00 
.00 
.33 
.33 
.00 
.33 
9-0 
days 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
.00 
.00 
6.50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.50 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
After 
Election 
15.50 
8.67 
9.00 
4.00 
.00 
16.40 
! 
.75 
1.00 
1.00 
! 
.60 
.80 
.60 
1.00 
.20 
.20 
.60 
.40 
1.00 
.60 
.40 
.40 
.60 
.60 
.80 
.20 
.80 
% 
Survey 
Sample 
10.34 
6.53 
16.21 
2.59 
32.58 
10.88 
! 
.53 
.28 
.61 
! 
.66 
.63 
.54 
.47 
.34 
.22 
.46 
.18 
.58 
.23 
.14 
.14 
.41 
.21 
.30 
.12 
.49 
! 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Warren, survey findings from the "The Changing Climate for Union Organizing at the Turn of the Millennium, Part 1: 
NLRB Campaigns", February 2011. 
Looking at the summary data on employer behavior, for example, in 89 percent of all campaigns surveyed 
employers require workers to attend captive audience meetings with top management during work time. The 
majority of employees attend at least five of these during the course of a campaign. In 66 percent of 
6 
! 
campaigns workers are required to meet alone with their supervisors at least weekly, where most threats 
and interrogations occur. Workers are threatened with plant closings in 57 percent of campaigns and with 
loss of wages and benefits in 47 percent. In 64 percent of campaigns workers are interrogated about how 
they and other workers are going to vote, mostly by supervisors (53 percent), while employers use 
surveillance in 14 percent of elections.13 
Employers also increasingly use fear and violence. Twenty-one percent do police walk-throughs with less 
than 1 percent relating to any arrest or investigation and 14 percent bring in security guards or put up 
security fencing. Most egregious, workers are discharged in 34 percent of campaigns. As shown in Table 3, a 
significant increase in discharges begins at day 21 and continues over time. Finally, as shown in the last 
column of Table 1, these survey findings are all supported by the ULP data indicating that unions are filing 
ULP charges on the same issues that they reported to us were the most aggressive behavior by employers. 
But the finding that is most relevant to the issue of the timing of elections is this: employer opposition to 
unions is constant and cumulative. It begins before the petition is filed and continues steadily throughout the 
campaign. As reported, we found that 66 percent of employers held weekly supervisor one-on-one meetings 
with workers throughout the campaign. It bears noting that this was in a sample where the average campaign 
length was as high as 15 weeks. As shown in Table 3, at least 90 percent of all campaigns in our sample that 
had a serious violation occur more than 150 days or more before the election had supervisor one-on-ones at 
least weekly. And for those that had at least one serious ULP violation after the election the rate was still 60 
percent of campaigns. 
Table 3 shows that this constancy is true for the full range of other aggressive tactics as well, with discharges, 
threats, promises, and surveillance holding steady across the many weeks and months before the date of the 
election in these campaigns. In addition, employers rarely use one opposition tactic in isolation; multiple 
tactics are used in combination and steadily to coerce workers to vote against union representation, as 
indicated by the last row in Table 3, which describes the percentage of employers who use ten or more 
aggressive tactics. For those campaigns where at least one ULP occurred 40 or more days before the election, 
at least 60 percent of employers used ten or more aggressive tactics. 
When we tracked our ULP data more closely, reading over each case to see whether charges occur in 
different times in different campaigns, we find that in cases with large numbers of serious ULPs, the 
allegations tend to be more likely to be spread across the entire campaign, rather than clustered in one 
specific time period, and that filing charges does not stop the employer from continuing to commit more 
serious violations of the same or escalating nature. Still certain kinds of charges do tend to be clustered 
during different periods of the campaign. In particular, interrogation, surveillance and harassment are 
especially concentrated in the weeks before the petition is filed, while discrimination and retaliation for 
union activity, although present throughout, seem to also start out very high and then peak again just before 
the election. If there were any period which has a lower amount of activity it would be the twenty days after 
the petition was filed. But there is so little data from that period it is difficult to analyze. In addition, there 
simply are no data on campaigns with ten day certification periods since they occur in less than 1 percent of 
elections. Twenty day certification periods are such a new phenomenon, appearing just since 2008, that they 
have yet to be researched (See Figure 1). 
Our 2003 ULP and survey findings, in combination with the larger findings for our total sample in our NLRB 
ULP Document Database about the timing and time span of employer behavior, tell us a great deal about the 
important role of timing in the NLRB election process, in particular the time between the date employer 
opposition begins, the date the petition is filed, and the date the election is held.14 Our ULP documents show 
that some of the most egregious employer opposition starts long before the union has even filed the petition. 
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Forty-seven percent of serious ULPs are filed before the petition, including 60 percent for interrogation and 
harassment, and 39 percent for discharges for union activity and 54 percent for coercion and threats. And 
employer opposition continues unabated from the first moment the union campaign goes above ground, day 
after day and week after week leading up to the election, and does not stop until the union has either lost 
the election or won a first contract. The cumulative effect of the steady, pervasive, and intense employer 
opposition undermines workers' attempts to exercise their rights to choose union representation free of 
coercion and intimidation. 
Up until now studies examining the impact of delay in undermining workers exercising free choice in the 
election process have relied on the time difference between the filing of ULPs and the petition and the 
election dates. By using a much more reliable and accurate timing measure—the date ULP allegations 
occur—we have been able to show not only that most employer campaigns begin much earlier than expected 
but also that there is a steady pattern of serious allegations starting very early in most campaigns and 
continuing on through to the election. In combination our findings make a strong empirical argument for 
streamlining the NLRB certification process to reduce the period between the petition and the election to the 
shortest number of days possible. 
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